CONCEPT NOTE: Integrated Science Education

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Public lectures by Prof. Bruno Bachimont

Professor Bruno Bachimont will be giving public lectures on December 10 and 11, 2009. Prof. Bachimont has been invited by the French Embassy in India, in the framework of their programme "Bonjour French Science".

Bruno Bachimont is Scientific advisor of the Department of Research and Innovation at the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (France’s legal deposit institution for all television and radio material) as well as Professor at the Université de Technologie de Compiègne where he teaches computer science, logics and philosophy. A graduate of the Ecole des Mines de Nancy, Prof. Bachimont received a PhD in Computer Science from the Paris 6 University in 1990 as well as a PhD in Philosophy from the Ecole Polytechnique in 1996.

Prof. Bachimont has published widely in the fields of artificial intelligence, knowledge-based systems, indexation, and document engineering and is the author of “knowledge and content engineering : Documents and ontologies” (in french, Paris: Hermès, 1994 2nd ed).

Prof. Bachimont is currently involved in projects related to digital preservation, audiovisual/multimedia indexing, using formalisms and theories drawn from the knowledge representation paradigm (ontologies, conceptual graphs, description logic), the document paradigm (XML, XML-Schema, MPEG-7) and the audiovisual world. The projects are undertaken within a general conceptual framework which borrows from Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler’s work on the philosophy of knowledge and writing to explore the mutual influence of mind and technique, of thinking and intellectual technologies.

The talk on Dec. 10 will be hosted collaboratively by the Centre for Internet and Society and the Centre for Contemporary Studies at IISc
Date: December 10, 2009 (Thursday)
Time : 4pm to 6pm
Topic: 'Preserving Digital Memories: A Patrimonial Approach'
Venue: Centre for Internet and Society (No. D2, 3rd Floor, Sheriff Chambers, 14, Cunningham Road, Bangalore 52)

The talk on Dec. 11 will be hosted by the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society
Date: December 11, 2009 (Friday)
Time : 11am to 1pm
Topic: 'Formal Signs and Numerical Computation'
The talk will be followed by a discussion on the integration of Natural and Human Science, and technology.
Venue: Seminar Room, Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (No 827, 29th Main, Poornaprajna HBCS Layout Uttarahalli, Bangalore 61)

Report on the Consultation on Integrated Science Education (October 3-4, 2009)

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Session 14: November 16, 2009

The ISE initiative of the HE Cell has begun work by taking a close look at the separation of the human sciences and natural sciences in India. We have tried to understand how did we come to the HE sector in terms of 2 isolated of spheres of pedagogy - the human sciences and the natural sciences. Did we inherit this through colonial education? Did the West, in this instance British education, bring the separation to us through colonialism or did we already have in our understanding of knowledge and education the possibility of such a separation, such that British education coming through colonialism found in us a nursery bed? Alternately did British education, through the conduit of colonialism, encounter an innocent soil that thought about and lived through pedagogic structures in a different way such that the British system and the separation it brought erased and recreated a pedagogic apparatus?

However one cannot deny, whichever be the case, we now have this separation of the human sciences and natural sciences in the higher education sector and any alternative imagination, including those of integration, before colonialism or alongside it or after it are marginal propositions. Hence ISE felt that one needed to examine the separation, look for its origin and see if such separations is a problem, how one could make one's way towards a bridging of the rift (this is of course not an easy task, given the years of inculcation and habit as well as the interruptive nature of existing nature of the human sciences and natural sciences). The initiative will also like to take into account along with the origin of the separation possible critiques of such separation in the West before or around the origin. We call these, that are located within the womb of the West, internal critiques of separation. The initiative cannot discount the fact that some Western scholars (and non-Western ones too) have before seen the problem of separation and have attempted course correction.

The other problem we cannot wish away is the question of whether the landmass now called India had imaginations of knowledge and education different from the one that took shape in the West. Would such imaginations bereft of the problem of separation that haunts the West, be a critical resource for integration attempts or would throwing off the hold/envelope of Western education be the ground for the liberation of Indian education?

This class focussed on origin and it tried to see where one could locate the origin of Western Science. J P S Uberoi (2002)locates it in a particular moment in the Protestant turn within Christianity. "The system of the categories, relations and attitudes of life and thought that we call modern western civilization was fully manifested first, not so much in early capitalism and the Renaissance in Italy, but in the sphere of religion during the Reformation at Marburg and the counter-Reformation at Trent, 1529 to 1545."

This took the class to consider a set of questions:
1. while hitherto it has been customary to see a divide and separation and schism and wedge between science and religion, one could also phrase a surreptitious train of continuity, at times with the entire Christian tradition. At other times with Zwingly as critique of the Catholic trend within the Christian tradition. We felt that we needed to search this area and get the historical facts continuity-discontinuity right.
2. whether Christianity could be the exclusive attribute of the West or would the extent and span of the Christian multi-nodal? Even parts of India could be the node. Would it then be better to split our examination not in terms of Christian and non-Christian but in terms of theological and paganism?

Resource Persons:

Dhruv Raina, Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Sanil V, Associate Professor, Philosophy, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT, New Delhi

R. Gadagkar, Professor, Centre for Ecological Sciences and Chairman, CCS, IISc

Sundar Sarukkai, Professor, School of Humanities, Centre for Philosophy (NIAS), Bangalore

Roddam Narasimha, Director, NIAS, Bangalore

Vijay Chandru, Chairman and CEO, Strand Life Sciences, Research Faculty MIT (Research Affiliate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Srikant Shastry, Professor, Theoretical Sciences Unit, Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research

Partha Ghosh, Professor, Academic Programme Coordinator at the S.N.Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta

Satyajit Mayor, NCBS, Bangalore

Mihir Chakraborty, Professor, Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Calcutta

Vivek Dhareshwar, formerly Senior Fellow, CSCS

Sasheej Hedge, Professor, Sociology, Hyderabad Central University

Sudhir Chella Rajan, Professor, IIT-Madras

Piyush Mathur, Professor, IIT-Madras

Shobhana Narasimhan, Associate Professor, Theoretical Sciences Unit, JNCASR

Franson Manjali, Professor, Centre of Linguistics and English,
School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies, J.N.U.

N. J. Rao, Professor and Chairman, Department of Management Studies, IISc

Abhijeet S Bardapurkar, Research Scholar, Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, Mumbai

Session 11: October 28th, 2009

Questions of separation and integration led us this time to other questions. What is Natural Science? What is Human Science? In the course of the discussion we came up with three points:
1. Was there something specific to the object of inquiry?
2. Was it related to nature of inquiry? The immediate problem here is that the object of inquiry is constituted by the nature of inquiry and vice versa.
3. The third point was the language of inquiry... the reduction of natural language to nomological language.

Given this, can what Natural Science is be generated out of the history and space of its emergence?

We first had to answer who is undertaking this inquiry? Where is the subject located, what are his or her biases? What are those positions that inform the subject's inquiry? That again took us in 3 directions...
1. The subject who is the recipient and the user of the services of science and technology but who is looking back at what had been received. There are subjective priorities that would become fundamental (the suffering of the subject is clearly foregrounded; at other times it could be empowerment; entitlement could also become important).
2. The subject as producer of scientific knowledge
3. The relation between the producer-subject and the recipient-subject
This was not to deny and we were aware that when we talk of subject we have in mind contingent subject-positions and not subjects with an identitarian embeddedness. Yet we were trying to think what the subject can do to science.

The interesting realization that the collective arrived at is that the subjective turn was not enough to mute the problem we were dealing with. Access was not enough. Institutional change was also not enough. Sensitivity was a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition. We were required to address the knowledge gap that separates the producer-subject and the recipient-subject. Also isn't there the knowledge limitation that haunts the producer-subject? Here Penrose's ambition comes to mind: Are minds subject to the laws of physics? What indeed are the laws of the physics? (Penrose, 1989, p4). Do we have a good enough physics? In itself, physics must negotiate between Newton, Einstein and Heisenberg. We could see that even the inauguration of the subject question would take us to the knowledge question. Nonetheless, this is not going back to the domains of knowledge. On the other hand, if one begins from the knowledge pole we still have to ask questions about the subject.

With this we can come back... what does this do to our question - what is Natural Science? Carnap and Popper came up with a prescriptive rendition of science; verifiability for Carnap and falsifiability for Popper. The other route is to go with a description of science and Kuhn... not what science should be but what science is in terms of its history, its enunciation, and its researchers' collective. In that sense, we have contended with the prescriptive program and seen its limits. What we are doing is attempting the descriptive program sincerely and see the process of science-making, see how objects of inquiry, nature of inquiry, language of description, causal explanations, predictability theories, the producer-subject, the recipient-subject, knowledge in itself, in its deployment, and in its use and reception, all of these in their over-determined and contradictory dimensions constitute provisionally 'Natural Science'. So the ISE integration urges us not to go by prescriptive definitions (verifiability & falsifiability become measuring rods for complex nature of human activity in different cultures and in different time frames and the culture question becomes present as a critique here). Maybe we go through the pain-staking work of observation and understanding and description; in a shared form the experience of science-making. It is only after going through all this, a work that is necessary for the Human Sciences as well, can one begin to see these (science)makings (not knowing, but ways of making knowledge) could be seen in their interruptive and integrated moments of relationality.

'Varieties of Meaning' by Prof. Franson Manjali

Meaning, one of the most ubiquitous phenomena of our quotidian life, is also perhaps the most difficult to figure. The varieties of meaning, or the attempts to understand meaning are as ‘mindboggling’ as the approaches to figure mind. Mind and meaning, which depend on and elude each other, can only be figured, but never conclusively. A short survey of the figures of meaning, from different traditions and schools is attempted here. These include the philosophical, semiotic and cognitive approaches, such the sign, embodied meaning, interpretation, sense (in many senses), reference, metaphor, trace, différance, sphota, apoha, rasa, jouissance, etc.

* Meaning in / of Life: the location of meaning?
* ‘Meaning of Meaning’: The ‘semiotic triangle’
* Sense and Reference. (Sinn und bedeutung): Truth and Meaning.
* Meaning for behavioural (structural) linguistics:

L. Bloomfield (Language, 1923) : The situations which prompt people to utter speech include every object and happening in the universe. In order to give a scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every form of a language, we should have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in the speaker’s world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very small compared to this.

"the statement of meaning is, therefore, the weak point of linguistic study, and will remain so until human knowledge advances far beyond its present state."

* C. S. Peirce and Semiotics: Icon, Index and Symbol.
* Saussure, Semiology and signification:
* Phenomenology: knowledge as meaning, and intention.
* Hermeneutics: Meaning of being; ontico-ontological difference.
* Linguistic relativism of Sapir and Whorf.
* Indian Theories of Meaning: Sphota and Apoha; Rasa and Artha
* Structuralism and the humanities: Jouissance
* Lacanian psychoanalysis:
* Speech acts: performative.
* Post-structuralism.
* Derrida: Writing, trace, and difference
* Levinas: Sense and Trace.
* Writing and Sense: Jean-Luc Nancy.
* Morphogenesis of Meaning.
* Formal Semantics: Narrow and Broad Content.
* Body, Mind and Meaning: Metaphor and the Metaphor of Language; ‘Accusative’ model of language.
* Neuroplasticity and Metamorphosis.

'Defining Science, Relation between Science and Language, and the Indian Rational Tradition' by Prof. Sundar Sarukkai

What is science? Why is it so difficult to define? Why is it such a matter of contention? We may define science as objective inquiry, as empirical, as experimental, as observational, as rational, as determining cause and effect, as demanding verifiability, as prediction, as hypothetical-reductivist. Problems arise (1) because each science within the sciences privilege one over the other - astronomy privileges observation while chemistry privileges the experimental and (2) when we try to fit these terms to areas of study ... from cooking to astronomy or from mathematics to social sciences. Scientists themselves define science differently; at times as that which is ahistorical, apolitical and acultural (as against the human sciences which have all the above attributes). Most often, science has been defined not by what it is but by what it is not. It's definition is in that sense exclusionist, not only of those areas of study that it cannot legitimize, such as metaphysics but it is also exclusionary within itself. There has traditionally been a hierarchy within the sciences. Mathematics reigns at the top as the science that is necessary to all other sciences. Then comes physics, then chemistry and lastly biology.

Prof. Sarukkai then starts to clearly state the foundations of the Institution of science. First of all, it is about membership and about associations such members form. Science is defined as what scientists do; science is what scientists say it is. This understanding does not allow for engagement with science by the perceived outsider. Also it is about title-giving. The title is an acknowledgement of authorship and of the authority it bestows upon one; it confers the identity of being an expert in science. Thus, the institution of science protects its own terrain - in terms of both state support and funding.

We next come to the the relationship between science and language. Ultimately science is about description and making that description as accurate as possible; it is about presenting the real as real. Language is the tool science requires to carry out its task but herein lies a problem. Language is imprecise and ambiguous. Worse, it is used by ordinary people to describe the world ordinarily scientists describe it must be scientific and pure (pure in the sense that it must approximate the real as closely as possible); it must be better than 'natural language'. Better still, it must be mathematical. Galileo recognised this relationship between science and language. He recognised the necessity of description in measurable quantities and terms of primary qualities, and in mathematical terms. He felt that mathematics is the language of Nature as it eerily allows the scientist a precise linguistic method to describe the world. Nonetheless language, although metaphorical, even verbose and perhaps unreal itself can also describe reality. However to describe the real, you need to transcend it. You need to engage with the imaginary. And it is mathematics that allows you to do that.

At this point we make some qualifications. Who decides if you are doing science? Why did Europe and modern science decide that India had no logic, no rationality and thus no science? Indian science, that predates Western science, in all its branches (except Charvaka) is based on logic; it has a system of inferences. There is an argument that because modern science has come from Europe, only a European tradition of philosophy should be used to evaluate it - hence the 'philosophy' component of philosophy of science would need to be western; here Prof. Sarukkai would say that Indian philosophy could also be used to evaluate science - only the terms of evaluation would be different. All the more because while modern, western science struggles with the problem and the divide of the empirical and the theoretical, Indian Science (and philosophy) travels somewhat with ease from the empirical to the theoretical. This is because the separation of the empirical and the theoretical is according to Prof. Sarrukkai a Greek problem, not an Indian one. Critiques of Indian science ask then why was the origin of Modern Science not in India. Prof. Sarukkai answers that the rational tradition of Indian thought did not create modern science (the way it got created in the west post-Galileo) because it did not need to modify language and mathematics to understand the real the way the West needed to.

Session 10: October 12th, 2009

This session was so interesting because we all travelled back to the origins of the problem. The questions move backward but the initiative moves forward...

I invite responses from everyone who can think of possibilities and alternatives for the problems posed here.

What is a concept? What is a category? How do we distinguish between the two? For instance, is money a category or a concept?

Is it that Human Sciences deal with concepts while Natural Sciences deal with categories?

Can the nature of engagement with a concept or category be represented as the subjectivity and objectivity polemic?

What is the primary distinction between the Human Sciences and Natural Sciences?

Causal explanations seem to be central to the Natural Sciences. Is it that Natural Sciences are about strict causal relationships while Human Sciences require only loose causal relationships?

Why do we assume that the human sciences cannot be explanatory? Or Natural Sciences cannot be introspective?

Why are we trying to integrate the Human Sciences and the Natural Sciences? What really is the necessity for this definition and delineation?

Why do we not try to integrate the different schools of Indian Philosophy? Why are we dealing with these Western Sciences?

If Natural Sciences concern themselves with explanation and Human Sciences concern themselves with interpretation, would integration bring intervention? Knowing and Being are not sufficient without doing. Should not that be our aim?

Is the ought question a part of both Sciences? Or is it a separate space?

Session 9: October 7th, 2009

Course 903 is an excellent melting pot for ideas. The questions that crop up during class discussions ferment and produce aromas that draws the Integrated Science Education Initiative forward. These questions are crucial and if these can be definitely answered, I think we can all sit down to a banquet of results.

I invite responses from everyone who can think of possibilities and alternatives for the problems posed here.

Integration is risky. Descartes' contribution to Western Science produced in time a disciplinary regime. The Episteme-Techne-Phronesis model we are discussing now can produce instead a thematic regime. But can it avoid disciplinary sedimentation itself?

Can a thematic regime avoid being trapped in the problem of the sponsor's hegemony in deciding which theme merits study?

How do we determine what is a theme? Empirically anything can be a theme. So how do we distinguish between a thing and a theme?

Once determined, what will be the mode of addressing the theme?

Would studying an integrated theme require one person to study all the different disciplinary specializations?

Can we actually bring matters of the material world to the dimension of phronesis? For example in astrophysics, we are studying the star and it is the sole concern. How then to bring that area of study to the human sciences?

Week 3: Revisiting Plato and the Question of Paradigm

One of the important themes discussed at the beginning of the third session was Plato’s allegory of the cave in ‘Book VII’ of The Republic. The major concern was to revisit and clarify the classical questions regarding knowledge production. Our course instructor suggested that the allegorical character of our existence in the world, as Plato describes in the case of prisoners in the cave, predetermines an inevitable method to arrive at the truth beyond the realm of ordinary things. This journey, in Plato’s conceptual architecture, is again quite allegorical to the prisoner who happens to go out of the cave and experience the reality for himself. However, the prisoner is fatally bound to get back and live in the prison among others, and there arises the problem. He may not be able to convince others of his experience and exposure to truth. One of the possible interpretations of the passage is: this was an allusion to Socrates’ death. His fellow citizens who sentenced him were exactly like the prisoners who refused to believe the experience of the enlightened one.

Beyond the manifest nature of things and visible effects of natural processes, the path towards the ultimate knowledge for Plato is the path, allegorically speaking, that leads to the reality outside the cave. Whether it is a profound meditation on justice or any attempt to understand the deeper secrets of things in nature in the creation a technological artefact, one has to necessarily follow the same path. [However, while interpreting the allegory of Cave our instructor made many a contextual references to alternative readings of Plato including the feminist inversions.] The major conclusion of the discussion was that in the Platonic scheme of thinking there is hardly any possibility of separating sciences. A paradigmatic exposition of Plato’s allegory therefore shows one of the possible models of an integrated view on knowledge.
Another major text discussed was an autobiographical interview of Thomas Kuhn in The road since structured philosophical essays, 1970-1993 eds Kuhn,Thomas;Conal,James; Hangeland,John. Chapter ten of the same book was also discussed. Kuhn makes his reservations on the possibility of drawing a line between natural sciences and human sciences while responding to Charles Taylor’s paper entitled ‘Interpretation and Sciences of Man’ in Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

The discussion singled out one of the common grounds to which both Taylor and Kuhn agree. It is the possibility of sharing a concept between individuals without at the same time sharing any belief. This point was further clarified by invoking the classical relationship between knowledge and justified belief. Kuhn maintains that it is impossible to identify a tenable principle that bars human sciences from engaging in puzzle solving research like natural sciences. It also equally applies to natural sciences that “no lasting base for normal puzzle solving science need be available to those who investigate them; hermeneutic reinterpretation may constantly be required”.

Our discussion concluded that the line between the sciences is there in some areas with some modest variations in their contours.

This was however only an introduction to the Khunian idea of paradigm. The major exercise in the session thereafter was to arrive at a conceivable definition of paradigm. Our instructor led us to discover the two meanings of paradigm in Kuhn’s work. First one implies the ideas, methods and techniques collectively shared by scientists. These are fundamental to the constitution of a normal science which decides as to whether a particular case in question can be considered scientific or not. The second meaning of course is paradigm as an example, which stands for the general disciplinary matrix.

Week 2: A Philosophical Response to the Two Cultures

At the outset of the second session our course instructor pointed out a couple of important pedagogic principles concerning the nature of one’s engagement with philosophical works. The emphasis was essentially on methods of developing an argument with respect to a concrete case in question. He cautioned us against the importance of arriving at a theoretical position as a result of a tenable heuristic exercise in an a posteriori manner, rather than get swayed by a priori assumptions.

Thereafter the discussion briefly dealt with relativist’s critiques of truth and the question of reflexivity. Apart from a brief elucidation of the concepts, he suggested, as a way out, that what is seminal to the making of any coherent method of identifying truth is to identifying the ‘truth of the relative’. This was a clear allusion to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. And, thus this discussion set up the background for discussing the readings.

The discussion thereafter was on select excerpts from C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures. One of the important points Snow makes is that it is the respective pedagogic practises of both natural sciences and social sciences that bring about the two cultures. Natural scientists and Social scientists get therefore deeply rooted in this culture of relative ignorance of each other. This imposes an already implied limitation on the possibility of integration. The broader approximation we arrived at was that it is important to address the cultural implications of the existing practices of the sciences and to re-examine the role of the ‘pedagogic conveyer’.
Against the background of this material a serious concern was raised regarding the possibility of a unified culture. In response to this question our instructor spoke about the importance of redefining the existing disciplinary relations as well as the importance of rephrasing some of the long standing questions that guide present modes of inquiries.

Week 1 – August 3, 2009; On the Threshold of Integrated Sciences

The first session of the course entitled “Natural and Human Sciences: Arguing about the Two Cultures” began with a prolonged introductory remark by our course instructor. It was essentially a preparatory groundwork for placing the contemporary problematic context in which the natural and human sciences operate. Tracing the history of western thought, he made an attempt to situate the separation of the natural and human sciences (Naturwissenchaften and Geistwissenchaften). Subsequent elaboration on the separation was to shed light on the interpretative character of the human sciences and the explanatory character of the natural sciences on which the disciplinary separation is based. He then demonstrated how this philosophical separation at large governs the methodological orientations of all coherent traditions of investigations within the entrenched bounds of natural and human sciences.

Having characterised the separation as an inherited disposition of the Sciences from nineteenth century debates (the natural sciences concern the study of material and biotic world, and the human sciences concern the study of the world of humans), the discussion swiftly began to problematise the separation; and in the process laid out the project of the integrated science initiative.

In the following hours a series of concerns were articulated by students.

One of the major concerns raised was about the implications of taking extreme positions for the separation of the sciences. The question was in response to certain standardised practises of physical sciences. It was: are there certain things that can be (or should be) objectively quantified? This question opened up a discussion on the invention of thermometer as a device that can quantitatively express a quality.

Two scholarly writings by natural scientists were discussed subsequently. They are: Raghavendra Gadagkar’s “The Evolution of a Biologist in an Interdisciplinary Environment” in Jahre Wissenchaftskolleg zu Berlin 1981-2006; and Gerald M Edelman’s “Forms of Knowledge: The Divorce Between Science and the Humanities”& “Repairing the Rift” in Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge.

Gadagkar’s essay incited another round of discussion on the differences between natural scientists and social scientists in the modes of presenting the results of their investigations. Social scientists, he observes, increasingly tend to quote their predecessors. The question that followed was: why do social scientists have to look for crutches of authority? This led to a broader approximation about the methodology of social sciences that they inevitably require references to previous authors; even if it is for the pursuit of building up a critique. However, a question as to whether the “quote/unquote” difference was historically there before the birth of human sciences was left open to further investigation. Following this, our attention was dragged to the project of integration and expressed the doubt that the difference in orientation maybe due to the disciplinary mooring or something peculiar to the way a particular author works. This view was well acknowledged and concluded that it was in fact the disciplinary moorings that develop two different cultures of natural scientists and social scientists.
On the contrary, another caution was expressed saying that it is quite problematic to assume that the dichotomy between natural sciences and social sciences is intact. If at all any difference, it is the object of study (for example in economics it is the object economy that the discipline tries to grapple with) that determines the difference. Referring to Buddhism another important question was also raised whether there were other ways of knowing which had not been documented.

On Science Wars

http://www.alp.mcgill.ca/Pub/Pub_Main_Display.asp?LC_Docs_ID=3610

Copenhagen in Debate

Michael Frayn's Copenhagen in Debate
Historical Essays and Documents On the 1941 Meeting Between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg

A. Einstein (1950). Out of My Later Years

The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physicist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of concepts of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without considering critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday thinking.
Einstein, A. (1936). "Physics and reality"

Interdisciplines: Rethinking Interdisciplinarity

The Complacent Disciplinarian
Ian Hacking


I am not a good person to discuss interdisciplinary studies because they have never been a problem for me. My undergraduate education in philosophy was more narrow than anyone today can imagine, and I loved it. Ever since then, I have dabbled in, and sometimes contributed to, more fields of thought than most people can shake a stick at. Analytic philosophers are not expected to write a book about experimental physics and another about multiple personality (etc.) but for me it has been the most natural, if not the easiest thing in the world, partly because I do not think of myself as ‘interdisciplinary’ but as applying my discipline in different directions.

Even my doctoral dissertation had two unconnected ‘parts’ that the examiners graciously accepted. One proved some new results in modal logic, while the other was infatuated with Wittgenstein’s reflections on mathematics.

My role model has tended to be a predisciplinary man, namely Leibniz. I once had the project to write a paper every year, about a topic that exercised him when he was x years old, when I myself was that age. I kept it up for a while, but flagged, which he would not have done. He is usually catalogued as a philosopher, but what is the field of knowledge, wisdom or practice in which he did not engage his energies? Peace studies. Mining engineering. Comparative linguistics. He spent more of his days on those fields (which had not yet been invented) than on developing the calculus or the nascent physics. Above all, he was curious about everything. That is surely one way to be interdisciplinary. By the way, the late Pierre Bourdieu, quite an interdisciplinary figure, also cut his teeth on Leibniz.

Curiosity: that is my role model, with the Leibnizian imperative, namely discipline. Work hard and get it as right as you can. Maybe a newish sub-discipline will emerge. But do not try to create disciples. Just respect your juniors, and tell them when you see that they, too, are trying to get it as right as they can. And say when by your lights they are not trying hard enough. Yes, that is discipline for sure. Not comfortable, either to administer or to receive.

How strange that word is, ‘discipline’. An old word, or words, as old as European vernaculars, and traipsing behind them not so much Roman Latin as the learning of Mediaeval times. In both French and English, there is both verb and noun. The noun that makes for interdisciplinarity implies fields of study defined by content and institution. But the verb implies chastising and punishment.

The root idea is that of a disciple. You can see how the idea forks. On the one hand, religious teachers, and modern scholars, engineers or artists who have disciples, create fields of knowledge, understanding and activity. Thus the noun. But then there is the verb, to discipline: the master chastises to ensure that the disciples toe the line. I say ‘chastise’, for I find that word in old French and English, and flogging is mentioned as a mode of chastising, of disciplining. How strange it is that ancient meanings are continued below the level of conscious awareness. Many who object to disciplines do so because they sense that they have been flogged by the institutional structures that determine the disciplines. There is no freedom to live other lives, or to create other kinds of knowledge.

I know many people who have been disciplined by disciplines. I mean, bullied by bosses who sternly strive to maintain pre-established institutional structures of inquiry. One need go no further afield than what I think of as my own discipline, analytic philosophy. Many students have felt oppressed by it. This is especially so because some of its practitioners have a remarkably narrow conception of what philosophy is. The student cannot get a qualification without fitting into the norms, and cannot get a job without continuing to do so. I respect these victims of the system, regret their plight, and hope that sometimes I have been able to help them.

Nevertheless, I would like to tell another story, of collaborations between disciplines, of the openness that has long existed between fields of expertise. Not a tale of breaking down of disciplinary boundaries, but of mutual respect, which, as a new group of issues arises, may create a new discipline. In my opinion what matters is that honest and diligent thinkers and activists respect each other’s learned skills and innate talents. Who else to go to but someone who knows more than you do, or can do something better than you can? Not because you are inexpert in your domain, but because you need help from another one. I never seek help from an ‘interdisciplinary’ person, but only from a ‘disciplined’ one. Never? Well, hardly ever.

Why am I so complacent? Because I lucked out. In 1965 I published a book about the logic of statistical inference. It had a good publisher, in those days (Cambridge). That surely helped. But the book said on the front page that I worked at a nothing university, in those days (British Columbia). This book had been written entirely in isolation. I had not talked to a single statistician. It was my own introverted thing. Within weeks of publication I got long, critical and helpful letters from the leading statisticians who were preoccupied by the foundations of their subject. People whom I had only imagined, since I was an introverted nerd. They wanted to talk, and I wanted to talk, and it took a few letters, in the old days, to talk. So I learned, if you spend your energies thinking about what they are doing, within the domain of what you know how to do, then concerned others will want to learn about what you are doing, within the domain of what they know how to do.

I have always lucked out. Of course, as I have carried more cultural and academic capital with me, it has been easier and easier to consult people from different disciplines. Yet I have regularly found that people who have skills want to tell you what they do and how to do it. Are you scared of someone because they know more than you? Forget it. They will love to tell you. My only ‘interdisciplinary’ experience, so designated, was at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (the ZiF: Zentrum für interdisciplinäre Forschung) in Bielefeld. In 1982 the late Lorenz Krüger organized – and found the funding for – a year-long research group dedicated primarily to questions in the history of probability. It included many young scholars, plus a few established ones, from a great many countries in Europe, plus people from the USA and Canada. There were historians of science, philosophers, statisticians with an historical bent, economists, mathematicians, experimental psychologists. Yes, a lot of disciplines were represented.

The year was an amazing success, largely owing to the gentle and sensitive leadership of Lorenz himself who encouraged us to do what we were good at, and to listen to others doing what they were good at. I often come across references, in the general literature, to ‘the Bielefeld group’. The productivity was amazing. In the first instance, two volumes of collected papers, and a volume, a sort of overview, written by a collective that was a subset of the group. In the following few years a number of truly excellent books were published by individual members of the group. Some of these are absolutely permanent contributions to the field – they have become ‘classics’. Plus many more specialist papers.

One might say, twenty years later, that the Bielefeld group created a sub-discipline in the history of science, for there continue to be published important new papers and books. I suppose that the history of probability and statistics should not count as a fully fledged sub-discipline. Nowadays a good sociological criterion for the existence of a sub-discipline is the existence of at least one journal explicitly dedicated to the topic. There is no such journal for the history of probability! Nevertheless, a great deal of first-rate research continues. I suppose that would have happened anyway, but Bielefeld provided a benchmark in the development of the field.

Is the Bielefeld group a model for ‘interdisciplinarity’? Yes and no. Yes, of course, the participants were drawn from a number of disciplines, and worked in an institution dedicated by name and practice to interdisciplinary research. But in a sense, the answer is ‘no’. Here I have to speak for myself. I never thought in those terms, and never once heard one of my colleagues use the word ‘interdisciplinary’. Of course it was there, in the name of our host institution, but since we always called it simply the ZiF, we never heard the word. We thought of ourselves as individuals from different disciplines with some overlapping interests.

Allow me another example. A couple of years ago I was privileged to attend the eightieth birthday celebration of Mary Douglas, the anthropologist. It was quite rightly held in the rather grand premises of the British Academy. Seven people spoke about aspects of her work. (I did Risk and Culture.) Aside from her biographer, exactly one speaker was an anthropologist, who discussed Mary’s early research in the Congo. And then: A famous urban sociologist-cum-politician. A biblical scholar - Douglas became fascinated by the pollution rules of the Pentateuch, and something of a Biblical scholar herself. An art historian. An expert on Hindu mythology. And no one spoke about her books on food and its meanings, or on styles of thought ... She is one interdisciplinarian! Except that is not how I think of her. Rather she applies her keen and totally unconventional mind and skills where she is interested. I shall have to ask her next time I see her, does she think of herself as anything other than a (non-conformist) anthropologist of a particular kind, education and tradition? I doubt it.

I conclude with a current hobby of mine. There is today an increasing awareness that diagrams can play a fundamental role in the communication of ideas. In modern physics, the Feynman diagram is ubiquitous, and an indispensable tool of thought. I have become interested in tree-diagrams. There are cognitive scientists who argue strongly that arranging hierarchies, taxonomies, temporal processes and the like, in the form of tree-diagrams, may be in effect innate, perhaps there is even a tree-diagramming module in the brain.

Certainly tree imagery is very deep in human culture: the Tree of Life goes back to Babylon and Assyria, long before the Hebrew Bible, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is ancient too. The candelabra in the Temple, the Menorah, are branching trees. The Cross is a tree, so shaped, and made of wood indeed. Tree images are present in most civilizations, even if they are most prominent in regions where trees are not so easy to come by. Yet the use of tree-diagrams seems very recent. How recent? I had carelessly said in seminars that the Linnaean hierarchy in which classes are defined by division (species, genus, order, class) obviously produced a tree-structure. A student kept on protesting that before evolutionary theory, systematic taxonomists did not think in terms of trees or draw trees. Well, she was right. I have adopted what I call ‘Scharf’s maxim’: it is not a tree unless it is drawn as a tree and called a tree.

I became curious about tree-diagrams in general. For example in traditional logic there is what is called the ‘Tree of Porphyry’, but which is not found in or mentioned in Porphyry’s Isagoge (his introduction to the Categories of Aristotle) written about the year 300. Also genealogical trees, the tree of Jesse, trees of consanguinity, which determine the impediments to marriage (viz. incest). Tables of kinship relationships, which have played such a role in twentieth century ethnography. Trees are important in logic and essential in many aspects of computer science, though the first theorem about trees appears to have been published only in 1857. I have, over the past two or three months, consulted, usually by e-mail, a vast range of experts, most of whom have been extraordinarily generous. I do not read Latin properly, let alone Greek, but now I think the first logic trees were drawn and described in Syriac, perhaps about 500. The very symbols of that alphabet are unintelligible to me. So I have been consulting masters of this or that language – and biologists, anthropologists, Byzantine scholars, Renaissance scholars, computer scientists. I am still trying to find historians of Islamic logic who can help me. All this in order to understand what we might call the cultures and uses of tree-diagrams.

If anyone should be curious: At present I believe that in the East, better named West Asia, tree diagrams start early, say 500. In Western Europe, and in particular Spain, there are trees of consanguinity from 600, but these are generalized to genealogical trees, the Tree of Porphyry, the Tree of Jesse only around 1100, always in Spain, so focal for joining Western Christian, Jewish (especially Cabala) and Islamic civilizations. The greatest tree-diagram fetishist of all time was a Catalan, Raymond Lull, who was at the focal point, around 1300. And who happens to have been one of Leibniz’s heroes. Paolo Rossi wrote a great book about the history of combinatorial logic and the universal language – ‘from Lull to Leibniz’.

Of course the fact that tree-diagrams are so recent in human history does not imply that they are not grounded in a universal mental module. It would imply that human beings learned to use and represent this faculty only in historical time. There is a further question for an evolving discipline, namely cognitive science. We have not yet sorted out how to run together questions of culture and cognition.

Is this an interdisciplinary quest? In one sense, ‘yes’: I am consulting experts from disciplines that are mutually unintelligible to each other. I have yet to meet a person truly knowledgeable about Byzantine civilization who understands evolutionary theory – or vice versa. Neither is likely to comprehend the present ambitions of the cognitive sciences. But in a more important sense the answer is ‘no’: highly disciplined scholars help out in a project that is quite easy to explain and to become captivated by.

I apologize for an all too complacent contribution to this ongoing series of discussions. I respect the questions raised by colleagues, but thought it worth while to put in a word for collaborating disciplines that do not need to be, in any important sense of the word ‘interdisciplinary’.

http://www.interdisciplines.org/interdisciplinarity/papers/7

Science, Society and Culture

Course 903: Natural and Human Sciences: Arguing about the Two Cultures

Higher Education has suffered from an inherited separation of the study of ‘natural worlds’ (material and biotic) and the ‘world of humans’. As a result, natural sciences (focused on the study of natural worlds) and humanities and social sciences (focused on the study of human worlds) have developed as two insulated spaces, each with their exclusive and narrow focus. This course wishes to re-visit and understand this separation (if at all there is a separation); as also situate the separation (of the Naturwissenchaften and the Sozial/Geistes-wissenchaften) in history and context. When and where was this separation instituted? How and why was it instituted? Who were its proponents? What were the arguments given in favour of the separation? What do we do with the separation today? Do we retain it? Or do we try and integrate the natural and social sciences? Why is it (if at all) necessary to integrate? What were the problems of the separation? What new (in terms of both solutions and problems) would integration offer? Is it at all possible to integrate? What would integration mean? Would it mean a displacing of social science methodologies by natural science methodologies? Would it mean a diluting of natural science methodologies by social science methodologies? Or would natural science be strengthened in the process? Would integration give birth to a ‘new science’ that is neither exclusively natural nor social? Or would the “line between the human and the natural sciences be firmly in place”? What are natural and social scientists saying about the separation? What are their thoughts on integration? This course will take up most of the above-mentioned questions (some in detail, others tangentially) in the form of readings that would be discussed in class and that would require participants to critically respond to and comment upon.

Session I. Natural and Social Science: Understanding the Separation (this session will discuss how three scientists [Gerald Maurice Edelman, an American biologist who won the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his work on the immune system; Stephen Jay Gould, an American paleontologist, evolutionary biologist, and historian of science; and Raghavendra Gadgkar, Professor, Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science who works on Evolution of Social Life in Insects, Insect Biodiversity and Mathematical Modelling in Genetics and Developmental Biology] have looked at the separation)

(a) Edelman, Gerald M. 2006. “Forms of Knowledge: The Divorce between Science and the Humanities” & “Repairing the Rift” in Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge – Yale University Press: New Haven and London – pp. 68-87.

(b) Gould, Stephen J. 2002. I Have Landed.

“Disciplinary Connections: Scientific Slouching Across a Misconceived Divide”

a. “No Science Without Fancy, No Art Without Facts: The Lepidoptery of Vladimir Nabokov”

b. “Art Meets Science in The Heart of the Andes: Church Paints, Humboldt Dies, Darwin Writes, and Nature Blinks in the Fateful Year of 1859”

(c) Gadagkar, R. (2006). “The Evolution of a Biologist in an Interdisciplinary Environment” in: 25 Jahre Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin 1981-2006, (Eds.) Grimm,D. and Meyer-Kalkus,R., Berlin, Academie Verlag, pp.167-180.


Session II: The Two Cultures (this session tries to make sense of the purported breakdown of communication between the ‘two cultures’ of modern society – the scientific and the humanistic. An engagement with the two cultures arguement is necessary because it has entered general lexicon as a shorthand for differences between two attitudes – the constructivist attitude informing the humanities, in which the scientific method is seen as embedded within language and culture; and the scientific attitude, in which the observer can still objectively make unbiased and non-culturally embedded observations about nature)

(a) Snow, C. P. 1998. The two cultures 2nd ed. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Introduction Stefan Collini vii
The 'two cultures' in historical perspective ix
Development of the idea of the 'two cultures 'xxii
Reactions and controversies xxix
The changing map of the disciplines xliii
Specialisation lv
The 'two cultures' in a changing world lxi
The Two Cultures C.P. Snow 1
The Rede Lecture (1959) 1
The two cultures 1
The Scientific Revolution 29


Session III: What is to be Done: Repair/Transcend the Separation?

(a) Cohen, Bernard I. 1994. “Note on 'Social Science' and on 'Natural Science' ” (pp. ix-xviii; 44-45; 189-200) in Interactions: some contacts between the natural sciences and the social sciences - Cambridge: MIT Press. 303.483 COH

(b) Berlin, I. 1997. “The Divorce between the Sciences and the Humanities” (pp. 80) & “Vico's Concept of Knowledge” (pp. 111-119) in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas Isaiah Berlin Edited by Henry Hardy With an introduction by Roger Hausheer – Princeton University Press.

(c) “The Natural and the Human Sciences” and “A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn” in The road since structure: philosophical essays, 1970-1993, with an autobiographical interview. Eds. Kuhn, Thomas S; Conant, James; Haugeland, John. Pp- 216-223, 253-324. 501 KUH


Group Discussion:

Given the separation, what is ‘integration’? How difficult it is to integrate? What are ‘Integrated Themes’?


Session IV: The Limits of Social Science (this session looks at one pole of the inherited divide – the ‘social sciences’. Session VI will look at the other pole – the ‘natural sciences’. This is necessary because the specificity of both the social and the natural sciences need to be marked out before integration comes up for consideration. Hence, this session tries to see what social sciences were attempting to describe or explain in terms of disciplinary mandates. In terms of methodologies, were they miming the natural sciences? Or were they trying to carve out a separate space for themselves? The social sciences are also ‘sciences’. However, how are they sciences? Are they different from the way natural sciences are sciences? Session IV and VI would also see whether the attitude to nature and to humans had gone hand in hand: was there an uncanny similarity in the way natural and the social sciences understood nature and humans respectively; such that the very assumption of separation could be re-examined. There was separation at the disciplinary surface, but at a deeper conceptual level, there were continuities such that in attempting integration one will still have to ask: integration of what?)

(a) Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1996. “The Historical Construction of the Social Sciences, from the Eighteenth Century to 1945” (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1996) in Open the social sciences: report of the Gulbenkian commission on the restructuring of the social sciences – pp. 1-32.

(b) Martin Hollis. 2000. “Discovering Truth: The Rationalist Way”, “Positive Science; The Empiricist Way” and “Ants, Spiders and Bees: A Third Way?” in The philosophy of social science: an introduction – New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-39, 40-65, 66-93

(c) Flyvbjerg, Bent 2001. Making social science matter: why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again – Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-87.


Session V: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (this session looks at how this separation of the natural and the cultural is a product of ‘modernism’ and yet how ‘modernity’ cannot sustain the separation in a sustained manner; how modernity is an intimate imbrication of the ‘pure’ and the ‘hybrid’; where the ‘pure’ involves the construction of a nature (and science) separated from culture, while the ‘hybrid’ involves mixtures of nature and culture. Latour sometimes describes the separation as one between material things and biotic subjects, or between human and non-human worlds. The result is that the realms of the real and the discursive are believed to be separated from each other, each a pure form. That's what moderns pretend to do, though in practice they produce nature-culture hybrids. For moderns, the purification process is overt, while hybrids are denied even though modernity is the condition of their proliferation. Modern both purifies and hybridizes, but never brings the two together, never admits to doing both, never allows that there is anything going on between the interstices of nature and culture, which are supposed to encompass all reality. Most of the things, Latour says, happens in the ‘kingdom of in-betweens’, between nature and culture, the middle kingdom that modernity cannot acknowledge without ceasing to be modern and collapsing back into ‘non-modern’ in-differentiation)

(a) Habermas, Jurgen. “A Historical Reconstruction” in On the logic of the social sciences “The Dualism of the Natural and Cultural Sciences” – ed. Nicholsen, Shierry Weber; Stark, Jerry A. pp 3-42.

(b) Bruno Latour. 1991. “The Proliferation of Hybrids” & “What Does It Mean To Be A Modern?” & “Revolutaon” (What Is a Quasi-Object?) in We have never been modern – Translators - Porter, Catherine: (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). Pp- 49-90


Session VI: What is ‘Science’? What Makes ‘Science’ Possible? (This session looks at the other pole of the divide – ‘natural science’. It asks: what is ‘natural science’? How does one distinguish between science and scientism?)

(b) “Scientism and Scientific Empiricism” & “The roots of Scientism” in Scientism: philosophy and the infatuation with science (ISBN - 0415107717 \ Call# 149 SOR) Sorell, Tom: (London: Routledge, 1991) Edited by Ted Honderich pp 1-40 149 SOR

(f) Herbert Simon. 1997. “Investigating Scientific Thinking: Why and How” & “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving” in Exploring science: the cognition and development of discovery processes – MIT Press – pp. 1-40.

(g) Richard Levins. 1996. “Ten Propositions on Science and Antiscience” (180-191) in Science Wars – Editors, Ross, Andrew: (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).


Session VII: Scientific Revolutions (This session delves deep into the self-definition of [natural] science; how philosophers have engaged with the question: “what is science?” and “what science ought to be?”)

(h) “Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn/ Two Theories of Science” in Mystery of mysteries: is evolution a social construction? Michael Ruse. pp-13-36.

(i) Putnam, H. 1981. “The 'Corroboration' of Theories” & Popper, K. 1981. “The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions” & Lakatos, I. 1981. “History of Science and its Rational” in Scientific revolutions. Ian Hacking. 60-127 – OUP.


Session VIII: Science and Self-Reflection

(j) Ian Hacking. 1983. “Introduction: Rationality”, “What is scientific realism”, “Positivism” in Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science.. Pp- 1-20, 186-210, 21-31, 41-57. 501 HAC 1

(k) Heidegger, Martin. 1977. “The Question Concerning Technology” (3-35), “The Age of the World Picture” (117-128) & “Science and Reflection” (155-182) in The question concerning technology and other essays - Translators- Lovitt, William: (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977


Session IX: Objectivity (Number of other divides and distinctions – the subject/object divide, the divide of the subjective and the objective, the fact/value distinction have contributed to the separation of the natural and social sciences. This session and the next would be a discussion on these divides and distinctions. These would be discussed in relation to what social science is or ought to be as also what natural science is and ought to be. Taking off from these divides, as also from the divide of episteme-techne-phronesis it would like to ask: what would be the contours of an Integrated Science?)

(a) Megill, Allan. 1994. “Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity” in Rethinking objectivity - Editors- Megill, Allan: (Durham: Duke University Press)

(b) Noam Chomsky. 1995. “Science/Rationality” in Z Papers - Special Issue.

(c) Herbert Simon. 1997. “Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?” in Models of
Discovery and other topics in the methods of science – Reidel Publishing Company: Dordrecht, Holland.


Session X: Fact/Value:

(a) Latour, Bruno. 2004. “A New Separation of Powers: Some Disadvantages of the Concepts of Fact and Value” (91-127) in Politics of nature: how to bring the sciences into democracy Translators- Porter, Catherine: (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)

(b) Karl Popper. 1985. “Knowledge: Subjective versus Objective” in Popper Selections – ed. David Miller – Princeton: Princeton University Press.


Session XI: The Birth of the Sciences: (these sessions would look at the birth of the sciences and the scientific method in the West – primarily in the context of the biotic sciences or the sciences of life. When we say birth of the sciences, we have in mind Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic. We also have in mind Bruno Latour’s “The Historicity of Things - Where Were Microbes before Pasteur?”. Such a ‘historicizing of what are now scientific things’ as also ‘an archaeology of scientific perception’ would help us see what were the questions that were being grappled with at the turn of the seventeenth century [if at all it was indeed happening then! Or was it taking shape well inside the Christian millennium? Which is what the section ‘Science and Christianity’ is looking at – given that the ‘relation’ between and the ‘separation’ of science and religion has been deemed as crucial] and how some in the West were trying to provide an answer to them)

(a) John Losee. 2001. “The Seventeenth-Century Attack on Aristotelian Philosophy” in John Losee, A historical introduction to the philosophy of science. pp.4-13, 46-85.

(b) Editor's Introduction by Fulton H. Anders in The New Organon, and related writings. Bacon, Francis. pp- vii-xxxvii.

(c) Meditations on First Philosophy in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and body René Descartes.

Supplementary Reading: Rorty, R. 1980. “Invention of the Mind” & “Persons Without Minds” in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.

(d) John Losee. 2001. “Newton's Axiomatic Method” in, A historical introduction to the philosophy of science. 46-85.

(e) Hegel's philosophy of nature: being part two of the Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (1830) Rep. ed. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Translators- Miller, A. V: (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2007) Foreword J. N. Findlay (v) & Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature 1-27.

(f) Foucault, M. 1973. “Classifying” & “Cuvier” & “The Human Sciences” in The Order of Things: The Archaeology of the Human Sciences – Vintage Books: New York - pp. 125-165 & 263-279 & 344-367

(g) Foucault, M. “Prefaces to the 1961 Edition” and “Preface to the 1972 Edition” in History of madness. Ed. Jean Khalfa. pp- xxvii-3

(h) Foucault, M. 1994. Preface and Spaces and Classes in The birth of the clinic : an archaeology of medical Perception. Vintage Books. Pp ix- 21

(i) Hacking, I. 1983. “Microscopes” in Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Ian Hacking. Pp- 186-210.

(j) Visvanathan, Shiv. 1997. “On the Annals of the Laboratory State” in A carnival for science : essays on science, technology, and development (Library \ Book \ ISBN - 0195638662 \ Call# 600.80 VIS) - New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

(k) Nicholas Rose. 2007. “Biopolitics in the Twenty-First Century” and “Bological Citizens”, in The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press, 2007, pp 9-40 and pp 131-154.


Session XII: Science and Christianity: Break or Continuity?

(a) “The Body of Christ and the Origin of Modernity” and “The Other Science of Nature in Europe” in The European Modernity: Science, Truth and Method by J. P. S. Uberoi, New Delhi: OUP – 2002 – Pages 25-75.

(b) William B. Ashworth Jr. 2003. “Christianity and the Mechanistic Universe” & Thomas H. Browne “Matter, Force, and the Christian Worldview in the Enlightenment” in When science & Christianity meet – The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London – pp. 61-110.


Session XIII: The Limits of Science: Why ‘Physics’ is a Bad Model for Physics? (These sessions would like to take stock of both the insider’s reflections on the ‘limits of science’ and outsider ‘critiques of science’. It also tries to see how the prescriptive programme of science was put to question by the descriptive programme of science and what would it mean to ‘defend science’ after the descriptive turn.)

(a) Polkinghorne, John. 1996. “Is science enough?” & “Understanding the physical world” in Beyond science: the wider human context - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge – pp. 1-21.

(b) Dupre, John. 2001. “Introduction” & “The Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology” in Human nature and the limits of science - Clarendon Press; Oxford University: Oxford – pp. 1-43.

(c) Dupre, John. 1996. “Introduction” & “Reductionism in Biology: Ecology” & “Reductionism in Biology: Genetics” & “Reductionism and the Mental” & “The Disunity of Science” in The disorder of things: metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science - Harvard University Press: Cambridge – pp. 1-14, 107-167, 221-243.

(d) Robert Almeder. 2000. “The Limits of Natural Science: Rescher's View” in Carrier, Martin; Massey, Gerald J; Ruetsche, Laura (ed.). 2000. Science at century's end: philosophical questions on the progress and limits of science – pp. 40-60.

(e) The disunity of science : boundaries, contexts, and power – Editors - Galison, Peter Louis; Stump, David J; {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996 – pp. 37-74.

(f) Latour, Bruno. 1999. “Do You Believe in Reality?” News from the Trenches of the Science Wars in Pandora's hope : essays on the reality of science studies - Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

(g) Hawkesworth, Mary E. 1994. “From Objectivity to Objectification: Feminist Objections” (151-177) in Rethinking objectivity - Editors- Megill, Allan: (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994)

(h) Stump, David J. 1996. “New Directions in the Philosophy of Science Studies” in The disunity of science : boundaries, contexts, and power Editors - Galison, Peter Louis; Stump, David J; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996 – pp. 443-450.

(i) Feyerabend, P. 1981. “How to Defend Society Against Science” in Scientific revolutions. Ian Hacking. 156-167.

(j) Sandra Harding. 1991. “Why “Physics” is a bad Model for Physics” and “Strong Objectivity and Socially Situated Knowledge”, in Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Cornell University Press, pp 77-102 and pp 138-163.

(k) McKeon, Richard Peter. 1994. “Philosophic Problems in the Natural Sciences” (12-24) in On knowing - the natural sciences - Editors- Owen, David B; McKeon, Zahava Karl: Compilers - Owen, David B: (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)

(l) Gadagkar, R. (2006). Guest Editorial – “Some Reflections on the Pursuit and Evaluation of Science”. Current Science, 90 (4), 473-474.


Session XIV: Orthodoxy under Attack: From the Prescriptive to the Descriptive

(a) John Losee. 2001. “Orthodoxy under Attack” & “Theories of Scientific Progress” in John Losee, A historical introduction to the philosophy of science. pp. 177-209.


Defending Science:

(a) Susan Haack. 2003. “Realistically Speaking: How Science Fumbles, and Sometimes Forges, Ahead”, Not Till It's Over: Reflections on the End of Science” in Defending science--within reason: between scientism and cynicism - New York: Prometheus Books. Pp-123-150, 329-353.

What is Integrated Science?

What is Integrated Science?

Background: Science Education in India has suffered from an inherited separation of the study of ‘natural worlds’ (material and biotic) and the ‘human worlds’. As a result natural sciences (focused on the study of natural worlds) and humanities and social sciences (focused on the study of human worlds) have developed in India as two insulated spaces, each with its exclusive and narrow focus. However our experiences of the ‘real world’ show us repeatedly that the real world is never split into two restricted worlds – the natural and the human; these two worlds are far from separate; they are interconnected, inter-related and often flows into each other; such that natural science studies are not just studies of natural phenomena; they have to them large elements of the human world. Hence, at the level of knowledge production what we need is an integrated approach – integrating objects of enquiry and methodologies emanating from the hitherto separate study of both worlds.

Broad Objective: Given the separation and the divide, the Integrated Science Education initiative of the Higher Education Cell feels that we need an integrated approach connecting not just natural and social sciences but also:-

(i) extant disciplines within the natural/social sciences (leading to inter-disciplinarity within natural/social sciences and new knowledge production through a surmounting of disciplinary rigidities; critical intra-disciplinarity in terms of a reflection on the history and method of one’s own discipline would be the ground for such inter-disciplinarity)

(ii) material, biotic and human worlds

(iii) experiences and knowledges of the ‘lay’ and the expert (the farmer and agricultural scientist for example)

(iv) service delivery and the recipient (patient and doctor for example)

(v) technology and the user of technology

(vi) interests of stakeholders (like the public at large and the scientific community)


History of Integration Efforts in India: It is not that in India, we have not had anxieties about this separation. Our best attempts at attending to this separation – the setting up of Humanities and Social Science (HSS) departments, in a largely techno-scientific atmosphere in the IITs – have not solved the problem of the inherited separation. Instead, science students have found HSS courses to be an unnecessary and alien addition to their already demanding science-technology courses. In this model of integration HSS departments are in effect never integrated within the science-technology institution. Here social science and humanities questions and methods are seen not as offering anything fundamental to science but merely imparting some version of value-based education to science students.

The other model of integration is one where primarily three social science subjects, namely philosophy, sociology and history emerge as gatekeepers or final arbiters of what science is doing, through philosophy of science, sociology of scientific knowledge and history of science. Herein social science subjects emerge as critiques of science, of scientific knowledge production and of laboratory life. Social sciences in this case seem to be offering judgments on the scientificity of science.

Whereas in the first model, social sciences and humanities departments come across as Innocuous Insiders, in the second model, social sciences emerge as stringent measures of the scientificity of science and the scientific method; they are, as if, Critical Outsiders.


The New Roadmap for Integration: Marking its distance from the above two models of integration, the Integrated Science Education initiative of the Higher Education Cell, would like to suggest working towards a third model. In this model, we are proposing a different understanding of integration, an understanding that transcends disciplinary divides and that focuses on those interstices where natural and human worlds somewhat evidently meet (health is an obvious example). We want to create a different trajectory of integration by rethinking the very need for social science questions in a science institution and come up with viable arguments for why this would enhance the quality of education offered and increase both research and employability options for students. Further, in the 21st century with the narrowing of the gap between biotic and technological worlds, the need to further develop an integrated approach (integrating natural effects and human intentional effects; integrating natural science and HSS methodologies) to study phenomena that could be called quasi-natural cannot but be emphasized. We need new sciences where such quasi-natural phenomena would emerge as objects of research and teaching.

To aid the emergence of such new objects of enquiry the Integrated Science Education initiative of the Higher Education Cell, plans to pilot Integrated Themes of research and teaching. Integrated Themes require an approach that can be taken up collectively-collaboratively. Integrated themes will have to be innovatively imagined, their relevance assessed, and research questions framed. Research in integrated themes require a pool of researchers drawn in from the natural and the social sciences, each interested in at least two things: (i) a critical re-visioning of his/her own disciplinary methodology and in learning from the methodology of other disciplines (be they natural sciences or social sciences) (ii) an openness to work as a member of a researchers’ collective so as to render a particular thematic specific knowable and teachable. It is premised on the perception that integrated ways would need to be found that are neither exclusively natural science ways nor social science ways.

While these were the problems of the field, there are a few promises. One is that science itself is moving away from mid-nineteenth century linear determinist models to ‘complexity theory’. Heterarchy (multiple orders) is replacing pyramidal hierarchical orders of enquiry. The image of a machine-like universe is being replaced by a holographic interactive network image of processes marked at a deeper level by ‘idiosyncratic microstates’; reductionism and objectivity is giving way to context and perspective. New methodologies, new objects of enquiry and new themes of research are emerging consequently.

In our science teaching institutions, one thus needs to face up to the challenge of doing science anew, doing it in its connection with the other disciplines, doing it more holistically, while remaining at the same time attentive to idiosyncratic particularities and details at the micro level. In the 21st century the study of ‘complex adaptative systems’ has become the ultimate interdisciplinary science, focusing its modelling activities on how microstate events—whether particles, molecules, genes, neurons, human agents self-organize into emergent aggregate structures. We would like to add to this themes that are relevant to contemporary global concerns (like bio-nano-information technologies, climate change, biodiversity, cognition, cybersubjectivity, energy), national developmental concerns (like health, nutrition) and concerns of users of science-technology (like user rights, experimental ethics).

Science Education in India must live up to the challenges of the present; and to assist in institutional efforts at living up to these challenges the Integrated Science Education initiative is planning to collectively (bringing together natural science and social science scholars) and collaboratively develop integrated themes in science teaching institutions.

Higher Education Cell
http://www.cscsarchive.org/irps/irp.2007-07-29.6937802083

CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES
http://ces.iisc.ernet.in/hpg/ragh/ccs/

One of the essential phenomena of the modern age is its science. ... In what does the essence of modern science lie? What understanding of what is and of truth provides the basis for that essence?

Martin Heidegger - The Age of the World Picture